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the relative inportance of political variables of therecipient countries.
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I. Introduction
The debt crisis of 1982 drastically changed the circumstances of the
developing world. After years of relatively rapid growth, partially fueled
by generous flows of foreign funds, in 1982 the poorer nations suffered a
major setback: growth plummeted, unemployment soared and acute balance of
payments crises ensued. Since then the direction of international net
resource transfers has been reversed and has run from the LDCs to the
advanced nations. Nowhere have these changes been more dramatic than in
Latin America. During the 1980s real per capita income in Latin Americaand
the Caribbean as a whole (excluding Cuba) declined by 8.2%.Moreover, in
some nations such as Argentina, Bolivia, Peru and Nicaragua, real incomeper
capita dropped by more than 20% during the decade of the l980s)
There is little doubt that economic recovery and thereturn to growth
and prosperity will take time and will require massiveamounts of funds and
deep policy reforms. What makes the recovery prospects rathergrim is the
fact that in a large number of the Latin American nationsdomestic savings
ratios have declined significantly during the last fewyears (see the 1989
World Develoyrnent Retort). Even if the liberalizationpolicy reforms advo-
cated by the IMP and the World Bank, among others,are undertaken, and if as
a consequence of them investment productivity increases, most countrieswill
still need to supplement their domestic savings withforeign funds. How-
ever, one of the most serious consequences of the debt crisis has been that
for most developing nations the accessibility to the worldcapital market
has been greatly reduced, if not completely closed. What makesthis situa-
tion particularly serious is the fact that,starting in the second half of
the l970s portfolio and bank lending became thesingle most important source
of capital flows, greatly surpassing direct foreign investment(Lal 1989).2
A key policy question -- and,in fact, one that haunts politicians as
well as economists -- ishow to improve the LDCs attractiveness forforeign
capital flows. In their recent contribution to the Handbook ofDevelooment
Economics, Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989) have succinctlycaptured the
profession's concern regarding this issue:
Commercial banks are unlikely to provide muchdevelopment finance
in the years to come. Bond markets, likewise, will beclosed for
countries with a poor debt experience. Efforts todevelop private
capital flows to debtor countries must, therefore, focuson other
mechanisms.
(p. 1434)
In the search for renewed sources of foreigncapital flows a fairly
long list of candidates, both old and new, has been identified.In this
paper I explore the potential role of two of these sources of additional
rivate capital inflows into the less developed countries:(1) increased
direct foreign investment (DFI), and (2) debtconversions (and especially
debt-equity swaps) mechanisms.
The paper is organized as follows: Section IIpresents the results
obtained from an econometric analysis of the determinantsof the cross-
country distribution of the OECDs direct foreign investment into theLDCs.
More specifically, the question asked is why do theadvanced nations tend to
direct their DFI to some countries and not to others.A fundamental aspect
of this problem refers to empirically determining therelative importance of
government policies, structural variables and political considerationsin
explaining DFI. The political angle is particularly relevant inthe current
circumstances when so many developing nations -- andespecially the Latin
American countries --havebeen experiencing massive political changes. In
Section III, on the other hand, I analyze the role of
debt-equity swaps as
instruments for reducing the debt burden and
potentially increasing private
capital flows, especially in the form of DFI, into thedeveloping countries.3
This discussion is particularly important, since traditionally themagnitude
of DFI has been relatively small, and poorer nations have tried todesign
mechanisms that would effectively increase the flow of external resources.
I discuss both the simple analytics of debt reduction schemes, as veilas
the recent Chilean experience with these mechanisms. Finally, Section IV
contains some concluding remarks.
II. The Determinants of Direct Foreign Investment: A CrossCountry
Empirical Investigatfon
Many authors have agreed that in the aftermath of the debt crisis
direct foreign investment should play an increasingly important roleas a
source of foreign funds for the LDCs. At the same time, most experts are
aware that the total volume of resources likely to be involved through this
channel will probably not be very large. For instance, afterpointing out
that bank loans and bonds issues are unlikely to have amajor role as
sources of resources for the LDCs in the years to come, Cardoso and Darn-
busch (1989) say that "the immediately obvious candidate [forproviding
foreign resources] is direct foreign investment. Unfortunately, the role of
direct investment has never been very large" (p. 1434). Thismeans, then,
that for any individual developing country two importantquestions refer to
both the future total volume of direct foreign investmentby the advanced
nations in the LDCs, as well as thecross-country distribution of this
limited volume. More specifically, will these resources flowto the "tradi-
tional" beneficiaries, or will they tend togo to countries that are
relative newcomers in the international scene? How will thepolitical
changes that have recently swept the third world affect the total volume and
cross-country distribution of direct foreign investment? Will countries
with a greater degree of openness attract more funds,or will the4
distribution of DFI be independent of structural reforms? All these are, of
course, crucial issues whose answers are to a large extent empirical.
A number of studies have empirically analyzed the sectoral distribution
of U.S. direct foreign investment, trying to determine why U.S. firms (both
financial and non-financial) have tended to favor particular sectors when
investing abroad.2 Relatively fewer efforts, however, have been undertaken
in order to understand what determines the cross-country allocation of
direct foreign investment by the advanced nations.3 The purpose of this
section is to empirically investigate the determinants of OECD direct
foreign investment into the LDCs during the period 1971-81. This time frame
was chosen for two reasons: first, some of the more important variables are
available for this period only; and, second, by concentrating on this
period, we are deliberately avoiding the abnormality and the complications
that the eruption of the debt crisis would introduce into this type of
empirical investigation.4 An important feature of this analysis is that it
explicitly incorporates the role of political variables -- suchas political
instability and political polarization -- intothe cross country
regressions. In undertaking this investigation, we tried to incorporate the
largest possible number of countries, both on the receiving and originating
ends. This quest for a substantial coverage has resulted on a need for
compromising on the quality of the data. First, we have had to concentrate
on aggregate DFI; there are no available data on the sectoral composition of
DFI for a large number of countries. Second, a number of potentially
important institutional variables, including detailed tax legislation, had
to be excluded from the analysis. In the sections that follow, we address
some of these important data problems in greater detail.5
Table 1 contains data on two indicators of direct foreign investment
for 58 less developed countries. The first variable DFISH. is definedas
the 1971-81 average ratio of OECD total direct foreign investment into





where ZDFIk is total DFI by the OECD in the LDCs in aparticular year.
The second variable, (DFI/GDP), is the 1971-81average of the ratio of
direct foreign investment received by country jto its CDP. DFISH, then,
tells us how total OECD direct foreign investment is distributedacross
countries; (DFE/GDP), on the other hand is more closely a measure of the
amount of DFI, relative to GDP, that country j obtains. Thus,by explain-
ing the behavior of these two indexes we will be able to better understand
what determines both the distribution (DFISH) as well theas level --
relativeto GD? --ofdirect foreign investment (DFI/GDP). As can beseen,
there is a considerable variability across countries of bothof these
variables. These cross-country differences areparticularly acute for the
case of DFISH, where one particular country (Brazil) takesas much as 30% of
total OECD's direct foreign investment during 1971-81.
More specifically, the goal of the empiricalanalysis is to use two
groups of regressors in explaining their cross country variability in DFISH
and (DFI/GDP): the first group of regressors is constitutedby traditional
economic variables that summarize the structure of eachcountry, while the
second group of regressors captures political and institutional
characteristics of each nation. We start ouranalysis in subsection 11.1 byTABLE 1
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Source: Constructed from data obtained from the United Nations, the
International Monetary Fund and Sunuzers and Heston (1987).6
following the more traditional approach of focusing on the economic determi-
narits of direct foreign investment. In subsection 11.2 the potential role
of political variables is formally incorporated into the regression
equations. Finally, in subsection 11.3 we present a sensitivity analysis.
11.1 Economic Determinants of OECD's Direct Foreizn Investment in the LDCs
In recent years the theory of direct foreign investment has rapidly
evolved, borrowing both from traditional trade theory and the industrial
organization literature. However, in spite of these developments, today
there still is not a unified and generally accepted theory of DFI. For this
reason, any empirical study on the subject has to take necessarily this
fact into consideration and, thus, follow what can be primarily describedas
a pragmatic approach. That is indeed the avenue we have decided to follow
in the current paper. In fact, in deciding which economic variables to
include in our cross-country regressions we have drawn from a broadgroup of
papers from the modern DFI literature. The explanatory variables used in
this study can be grouped into three broad and (somewhat) interrelated
categories:(1) variables that capture some of the most important
structural characteristics of these economies;(2) variables that are
related to economic policy and that, in principle, can bemanipulated by
these countries in order to make DFI more attractive; and (3) variables
that capture the political environment in each country. While in this
subsection we focus on the potential roles of structural andpolicy related
variables in explaining cross country variability of DFI, in the next
subsection we add political variables into the analysis. It isimportant to
insist, once again, that any massive cross country study, such as thisone,
faces non trivial problems in relation to data availability. Theseproblems
are particularly severe with respect to some of the policy related7
variables. As will be seen, we have handled these problemsmainly in two
ways: using proxies, when they were available, and excluding the variable
if it was not possible to find appropriate proxies.According to the most
basic traditional theories of DFI, advanced nations will tendto channel
their overseas investments to those poorer countries that havea higher
return on capital. However, from an empirical point of viewtrying to test
this hypothesis presents some problems: inpoor countries where there are
no well-functioning capital markets it is difficult to measure thereturn to
capital. As a consequence we have proxied (the inverse of) this variableby
real per capita income; it is expected, then, that with otherthings given,
countries with lower real per capita income will tend to receivea higher
share of DFI. In those DFI theories based oncomparative advantages, the
structure of production of the recipient country (e.g., thesectoral
distribution of output) is an important determinant of thesectoral
allocation of DFI. Although it is not straightforwardto apply this
disaggregated analysis to a cross country setting, it is clear thatthe
structure of production in the host country is an importantvariable to
incorporate into the empirical analysis.
In more recent theories of DFI, multinational firmslocatein foreign
countries in order to "internalize" the potentialprofits to be derived from
these niarkets.5 To the extent that one of theaspects to be "internalized"
by the foreign firm are economies of scale it isexpected that DFI will tend
to go to those countries with larger markets.Moreover, the transnational
firms' capacity to actually take advantage of thepotential profit opportun-
ities in the poorer nation will dependcrucially on the existing atmosphere
in the host country towards private
enterprise. One possible way (although
admittedly an imperfect one) of proxying the hostcountry's stance towards8
private initiative is by the size of government. It would be expected,
then, that in the regression analysis the coefficient of a variable captur-
ing government size variable will be negative. (See, for example, the
discussion in Nelleiner 1989.) Directly related to this is the role of
investment by other agents in determining the cross-country allocation of
DFI. If, as is the most plausible case, domestic investment and direct
foreign investment are complements, we would expect a positive coefficient
for domestic investment in the regression analysis.6 Also, to the extent
that, as has been recently suggested by a number of authors, multinationals
tend to be located on tradables sectors both the degree of openness of the
host country and the behavior of its real exchange rate, or level of
international competitiveness will affect both the level and geographical
location of DFI.7 In fact, in addition to government size, these are the
more important policy variables considered in this investigation.
In addition to the variables mentioned in the models of DFI discussed
above, a multinational's decision of locating a subsidiary in a particular
countrywill,in principle, be influenced by the specific DFI legislation,
including tax inducements, of the host country.8 Unfortunately, since there
are no comparable cross-country data on legal treatment of DFI, these
variables have been excluded from the regressions discussed in this paper.
Table 2 contains the results from estimating a variety of possible
specifications of linear cross country regressions on DFISH and (DFI/CDP)
using only structural economic variables as regressors. All variables are
averages for 1971-81. Since White's test indicated the presence of
heteroscedasticity, the different equations were estimated using weighted
least squares, with each country's population used as weight. It should be
noted, however, that when other weights were considered, or when OLS were9
applied, the results obtained were very similar. Based on the previous
discussion, the following structural independent regressors were included in
the equations: (a) Income per capita. As pointed out, this variable is
used as a proxy for the (inverse of the) return on capital and its expected
coefficient is negative. (b) Ratio of foreign trade to GD?, whose
coefficient is expected to be positive. (c) In the DFISH regressions the
country's real GDP was included as a measure of the size of the economy and
potential extent of scale economies. Its coefficient is expected to be
positive.(d) Domestic investment ratio. To the extent that domestic and
foreign investments are complements, its coefficient is expected to be
positive. (e) The share of government consumption in GD? was included as
an indicator of the size of government, and its coefficient is expected to
be negative. (f) The Summers and Heston measure of the real exchange rate
'was incorporated as an indicator of the country's degree of international
competitiveness and, given the way this RER index has been defined, its
expected coefficient is positive. (g) Different measures of each country's
structure of production (shares of manufacturing, mining and agriculture in
total GDP) were also included. The sign of their coefficients is not
determined a riort. (h) Finally, tworegionaldummy variables, for Latin
America and Asia were included in the regressions.
-
Ascan be seen from Table 2 the results are quite satisfactory. The
vast majority of the coefficients have the expected sign and most of them
are significant at conventional levels. Moreover, the R2s of the regres-
sions indicate that these structural economic variables explain, as agroup,
approximately 60% of the cross-country variability in DFISH and (DFI/GDP).
2
These R values are indeed very high for any type ofcross-country
regression. The most important findings in Table 2 can be summarized asTABLE 2
EconojcDeterminants of Direct Foreign Irwestment in LDCs:
Cross-Country Regressions
(Weighted Least Squares)
(Eq. 1) (Eq. 2) (Eq. 3) (Eq. 4) (Eq. 5) (Eq. 6)
Dependent
Variable FISH DTISH DFISH (DFI/CDP) (DFI/GDP) DFIfCD?',
Constant 0.019 0.097 0.026 -0.001 0.036 .0.0003
(0.324) (1.545) (0.457) (-0.328) (1.273) (-0.127)
Per Capita Y -0.19E-5 -0.70 E-5-0.29 E-5-0.44 E-6 -0.70 E-6-0.48 E-6
(-0.195) (-0.627) (-0.300) (-1.300) (-1.370) (-1.056)
Foreign Trade -0.057 0.019 -0.017 0.008 0.006 0.007
(-0.872) (0.279) (-0.222) (3.478) (2.391) (3.048)
Real CDP 0.27 E-9 0.234 E-90.163 E-9 -
(2.938) (2.600) (1.475)
Investment - - 0.005 - - 0.17E-3
Ratio (1.943) (1.670)
Government -0.005 - -0.005 -0.96 E-4 -0.12 E-3
(-1.964) (-1.967) (-0.88) (-1.109)
RZR 0.42 E-3 0.41 E-3 0.32 E-3 0.34 E-4 0.31 E-4 0.29 E-4
(2.457) (2.648) (1.924) (4.242) (4.323) (3.773)
Manufacturing 0.005 - - 0.19E-3 - -
(1.972) (1.981)
Agriculture - -0.003 - -0.10E-3 -
(-2.086) (-1.970)
LatinAmerica 0.054 0.100 0.088 0.002 0.004 0.003
(1.152) (2.484) (2.188) (0.981) (2.068) (1.754)
Asia -0.073 -0.040 -0.045 -0.001 0.001 0.48 E-4
(-2.472) (-1.444) (-1.641) (-0.460) (0.046) (0.044)
N 58 58 58 58 58 58
R2 0.619 0.595 0.618 0.598 0.584 0.592
1: DFISMis the 1971-81 average of the ratio of country js foreign invesrent
from OECD cout1tries to total OECD direct foreign investment. (DFI/GDP) is the 171-81
average ratio of direct foreign investment from OECD countries to GDP country j.
These equations were estimated using weighted least squares to correct for
heteroscedasticity. The average population of 1971-81 was used as a weight. The2
numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; N is the number of observations and R is
thecoefficient of determination.10
follows: First, as expected, real income per capita --whichproxies the
inverse of the rate of return on capital -.hasa negative, although
insignificant, coefficient. Second, in the (DFI/CDP) regressions the
foreign trade (or openness) variable is always significantly positive as
expected, while in the DFISH equations this coefficient turns out to be
insignificant. Third, in most equations were included the coefficients of:
(a) real CDP;(b) domestic investment ratio;(c) the size of
government; and (d) the international competitiveness index (RER) have
the expected sign and are significant at conventional levels. On the other
hand, the coefficient of the size of manufacturing sector is significantly
9
positive, while that of agriculture share is negative. Finally, the
geographical dummies are positive for Latin America and negative for Asia.
From a policy perspective these results indicate that, with other
things given, countries that (1) reform their foreign sector opening up
international trade; (2) reduce the size of government; (3) maintain (or
increase) their degree of international competitiveness; and (4) increase
the rate of domestic investment, will tend to see an increase in their level
of DFI. This result, of course, suggest that structural reforms are likely
to have important side effects not usually measured in traditional analyses.
11.2 The Role of Political and Institutional Factors
The results reported in Table 2 were obtained by restricting the
regressors to those economic variables usually considered as determinants of
DFI. It is a common belief, however, that the characteristics of the
political system in the LDCs play an important role in the process of
determining the magnitude and location of DFI.1° The purpose of this
subsection is to formally assess how important this common belief really is.
The question we address, then, is the following: after controlling for the11
structural economic variables of Table 2, how important havepolitical
variables been in explaining the cross-countryvariability in our two direct
foreign investment indicators?
Twodimensionsof the political system appear, a priori to be
particularly important in affecting DFI decisions: (1) the degree of
political instability, and (2) the degree of political polarizationand
violence. It is expected that increases in both of these variableswill
tend to have negative effects on our measures of DFI.Naturally, finding
measures for these political variables is a nontrivial problem in
implementiflg an empirical analysis of the type proposed here. In thispaper
we have used indexes of political instability computed by Cukiermart,Edwards
and Tabelljnj (1989). These indexes are based on apolitical data set
constructed by Taylor and Jodice (1983), which containsyearly observations
on regular and irregular (i.e., coups) government transfers, unsuccessful
coup attempts, executive adjustments, and other political events.
Cukierman-EdwardsTabelljni (CET) constructed their index onpolitical
instability by endogenously estimating from the data theprobability of
government change in any given year. This was done by fitting a probit
equation on government change on pooled time series and crosscountry data
for 79 countries, over the period 1948-82. Thedependent variable in this
probit estimate took a value of 0 for the years in which therewas no gov-
ernment change (regular or irregular), and a value of 1 otherwise. Inturn,
the explanatory variables in the probit model includedeconomic variables,
designed to measure the recent economic performance of thegovernment;
political variables, which accounted for significant politicalevents that
signal the imminence of a crisis; and structural variables, that accounted
for institutional differences and country specific factors thatdo not12
change, or that change only slowly over time. Using the pooled time series-
cross country probit estimates CET compute an estimated frequency of
government change in each country during the period 1971-82. The index on
political instability was then constructed by averaging the estimated
probabilities of government change over that time period. In this paper we
use this CET index of political instability as an additional explanatory
variable in the DFI regressions.
In addition to the political instability index, the augmented DFI
regressions also included an index that proxies the degree of economic
polarization in each country. This variable measures the extent of
political violence, and is constructed as the sum of the yearly frequency of
political assassinations, violent riots, protests, political attacks and
politically motivated strikes. The raw data for constructing this index
were taken from Taylor and Jodice (1983).
Table 3 contains the results obtained from the cross-country
regressions for OFISH and (DFI/CDP) that included political indicators. As
can be seen, the results are very satisfactory. First, the relevance of
structural economic variables appears to be even clearer than in the results
reported in Table 2. Most of the coefficients of economic variables have
the expected sign and are significant. Moreover, tests on the significance
of all economic variables as a group indicate that they are different from
zero at a very high level of significance (the values of the F-tests ranged
from 10.1 to 17.2). Second, the index of political instability is negative
in every regression and in three of the five equations where it is included
it is highly significant. The index of political violence has the expected
negative sign in two out of the three regressions where it was included, but
is never significant. Tests for the joint exclusion of the political13
instability and political violence indexes indicates that the null hypoth-
esis is rejected at high levels of significance. In sum, then, the results
reported in Table 3 for our full sample of 58 nations supports the hypoth-
esis that both economic and political variables affect the distribution and
magnitude of DFI. These results, then, indicate that reduced political
instability and polarization will tend to increase DFI, as will structural
reforms of the type supported by the World Bank and the IMF.
The fact that the political and structural economic variables are
statistically significant, doesn't say anything regarding the relative
importance of each of these variables. Table 4 addresses this issue by
reporting the standardized estimates of each of the coefficients for two of
the regressions reported in Table 3: equations 9 and 10. As can be seen
from these estimates, in spite of the fact that the political instability is
statistically significant in these two regressions, its relative importance
is not very high when compared to that of other regressors. This means,
then, that although the popular belief that the political setting matters
for DFI turns out to be supported by the data, it is also true that these
political variables are, relatively speaking, not the most important ones.
From a practical and policy perspective this suggests that some structural
reform measures, such as reducing the size of government and (for the case
of DFI/GDP) increasing openness are likely to have a greater effect on
capital inflows than an improved political atmosphere.
11.3 Sensitivity Analysis
An important question is how sensitive are our results to the presence
of outliers, and to the measurement of exogenous variables. The question of
the robustness of our estimates is formally addressed in this section.TA3LE 3
Direct Foreign Investment in LDCs:TheRoleofEcortoaic
And Political Variables
(Cross-Country Regressions -WeightedLeast Squares)
(Eq. 7) (Eq. 8) (Eq. 9) (Eq. 10) (Eq. 11) (Eq. 12)
Dependent
Variable OFISH DFISH DFISH (OFT/CD?) (DFIICDP) (OFT/GD?)
Constant 0.066 0.029 0.054 0.003 0.003 0.004
(1.172) (0.471) (0.925) (1.234) (1.364) (1.493)
PerCapitaY -0.31 8-5 -0.414 -0.49 8-6-0.75 86 -0.51 E-6
(-0.305) (.0.410) (-1.968) (-1.721) (-1.190)
Foreign Trade -0.008 0.053 -0.003 0.009 0.006 0.009
(-0.112) (0.796) (-0.040) (3.467) (2.454) (3.564)
Real GDP 0.14 E-9 0.26 E-9 0.16 8-9 -
(1.324) (2.829) (1.373)
Investment 0.005 - 0.006 0.20 8-3 - 0.15E-3
Ratio (2.108) (2.218) (1.876) (1.287)
Government -0.006 -0.005 -0.006 -0.24 8-3 - -0.27E-3
(-2.524) (-1.932) (-2.420) (-2.251) (-2.398)
RER 0.36 8-3 - - 0.298-4 -
(1.777) (4.122)
ianufacturing
- 0.005 - - - -
(2.051)
Agriculture
- - - -0.118-3 -
(-1.721)
Political -0.098 -0.063 -0.107 0.009 - -0.008
Instability (-1.202) (-0.619) (-1.927) (-2.251) (-2.032)
Violence Index - - 0.128-5 -0.73 8-7 -0.84 E-7
(0.767) (-1.100) (-1.050)
Latin #merica 0.083 0.466 0.079 0.003 0.004 0.003
(2.024) (0.958) (1.882) (1.295) (2.053) (1.406)
Asia -0.032 -0.071 -0.040 0.001 0.001 0.001
(-1.163) (-2.380) (-1.333) (0.840) (0.814) (1.031)
N 58 58 58 55 55 55
R2 0.601 0.622 0.606 0.520 0.595 0.531
Notea: See Table 2.TABLE 4
Relative Role of Specific Economic and Political Variables:
Standardized Estimates of Coefficients
Dependent Variable DFIISH DFI!GDP
Per Capita Y -0.035 -0.146
Foreign Trade -0.006 0.418
Real GDP 0.270 -
InvestmentRatio 0.294 0.223
Government -0.289 -0.289
Latin America 0.315 0.237
Asia -0.206 0.115
Political Instability -0.136 -0.237
Violence Index 0.089 -
Notes:These standardized coefficients are computed by multiplying each
estimated coefficient by the ratio of the sample standard deviation of the
regressor to the sample standard deviation.14
In order to analyze the role of outliers we carried out an influence
analysis (Belseley, Kuh and Welsch, 1980) to assess the contribution of each
particular country to our results. This analysis indicated that both in the
DFISH and (DFI/GDP) regressions there were three clear outliers: Brazil,
India and Indonesia. As a way to check for the robustness of our results a
number of regressions were estimated excluding these outliers. Some of
these results are reported in Table 5. As can be seen the results are
indeed robust. In fact, if anything, the exclusion of the three outliers
provide even greater support for the hypothesis that both economic and
political variables significantly affect DFI decisions. Notice, for
instance, how the foreign trade coefficient now also became significant in
the DFISH regression.
A second sensitivity exercise consisted on experimenting with
alternative variables that measure the political characteristics of the
countries in the sample. Two of these were the actual frequency of
government change (both scheduled and unscheduled) and the frequency of
unscheduled government changes (coups and unscheduled regular government
transfers). The following regressions provide an illustration of the type
of results obtained when these variables were incorporated into the analysis
with the complete data set (coefficients of continental dummies not
reported; complete sample used):
(DFI/CDP)4 —0.003+0.009Foreign Trade4 +0.22E-3 Investment
'(1.206) (3.181) (2.017)
-0.30E-3 Government. -0.34E-8 Per Capita Y
(-2.758) (-0.633) -
-0.37E-2 Frequency Government Change. N2 —58
(-2.005) R —0.641TABLE 5
Sensitivity Analysis; Direct Foreign



















































































Notes: These regressions were estimated after omitting from the sample the
three most influential countries: Brazil, Indonesia and India. For details on
the notatiorfused see the notes at the bottom of Table 2.
N15
DFISH. —0.078 -0.054Foreign Trade. +0.007
Investments
(1.410) (-0.684) (2.593)
-0.007Government -0.96E-lO Real GDP
(-3.075) (-0.843)




Summarizing, the sensitivity analysis presented here shows clearly that
the result reported in the preceding subsections are quite robust and that
the main conclusions presented above, regarding the role of political and
economic variables in determining DFI, stand independently of the sample
usedandof the measures chosen to capture the political characteristics of
each country.
Finally,it should be noticed that the regression analysis presented
here may be subject to some eridogeneity problems. Indeed, as pointed out
above, some of the structural variables may indeed be affected by the extent
of capital flows into these countries. In principle, this problem can be
handled through the use of standard instrumental variables techniques. The
problem with this, however, is that, as in most cross country studies, it is
not easy to find adequate instruments. One possible way out is to use the
structural variables for the previous decade as instrument: In fact, when
this was done, the results obtained were not significantly different. The
results, however, are still suspect from a simultaneity perspective. The
reason, of course, is that in order for these variables to be valid
instruments, it is required that the error terms are not correlated across
decades, which is not necessarily the case.16
III. Debt Conversions. Debt-Eguity Swaps and Capital Flows
Direct foreign investment is only one of the potential sources for
increasing capital inflows into the developing nations. A serious problem
is that historically the magnitude of DPI has not been very large. It has
been argued, however, that by using different debt-swap mechanisms, based on
the secondary market for third world debt, the developing nations could
significantly increase DFI, as well as other forms of capital inflows.11 In
fact, the proponents of this strategy have argued that in theory, these
debt-swaps are equivalent to an increase in capital inflows, which are then
partially used by the debtor country to reduce its foreign liabilities,12
The purpose of this section is to investigate whether debt-swaps in
general, and debt-equity swaps in particular can, indeed, be a vehicle for
increasing the volume of capital flows and DPI into the developing
countries. First I provide a brief discussion of the analytics of debt-swap
as mechanisms for potentially reducing a country's debt burden and helping
finance growth and, second, I review in some detail the Chilean experience,
where different modes of debt swaps have been used to reduce the stock of
foreign debt by approximately one half.
111.1 Some Analytical Aspects of Debt ForEiveress Based on Secondary Market
Mechanisms
A number of authors have investigated theoretical issues related to
debt forgiveness and market based schemes. Dooley (1988a,b), and Rodriguez
(1988) have analyzed the market valuation effects of buyback schemes, and
have concluded that the quoted secondary market rate is not the relevant
price for evaluating a major buyback program. The relevant price is the one
that captures the expected flow of resource transfers after the buyback.
Depending on the volume of the operation this price may be significantly17
higher than the ongoing secondary market quotation, as was indeed the case
in the Bolivian buyback of 1986 (see Bulow and Rogoff, 1990).
Corden (1988), Helpman (1988), and Sachs (1988), amongothers,have
discussed the effects of debt overhang on the debtor country's incentives to
adjust and implement structural reforms geared at generating additional
foreign exchange. These authors have pointed out that a situation of debt
overhang -- whichhas been referred to as "being on the wrong side of the
debt-Laffer curve" -- isequivalent to having a 100% marginal tax on foreign
exchange earnings. The reason for this is, of course, that any additional
foreign exchange will be used to increase payments to creditors. Under
these circumstances there are little, if any, incentives for governments to
implement costly, politically unpopular and harsh adjustment measures. This
incentive effect has in fact become the most important argument in favor of
debt forgiveness. By forgiving a portion of the debt the implicit marginal
tax can be reduced inducing countries to undertake structural reforms that,
in principle, may increase the actual resource transfer to creditors. Under
these circumstances it will pay for the creditor to forgive.
Krugman (1988b) has used an option-pricing approach to investigate the
creditors decision on whether to forgive or finance the debt. He showed
that as long as there are good states of the world where the debt will be
fully paid, it is in the creditors interest to finance rather than forgive.
The reason is that by forgiving the creditor reduces the maximum possible
payment (the "ceiling") without affecting the minimum payment, or "floor",
obtained under the bad states of the world.
Krugman (l988a), Froot (1988), Froot et al. (1988), Sachs (1988) and
Corden (1988) have investigated whether debt relief granted via mechanisms
based on the secondary market is in the interest of the debtor. They argue18
thatthiswill be the case only under very special circumstances, Moreover,
if this is true it will also be the case that forgiveness will be in the
interest of the creditor. T,illiainson (1988), however, has argued that if
there are heterogeneous banks with different degrees of optimism there is
additional room for market based debt relief.
The two most important swap mechanisms are debt-equity swaps and debt-
buybacks. Debt-equity swaps convert a foreign loan into domestic equity of
the debtor country. Although the country's external debt is reduced, this
operation amounts to a replacement of one type of obligation for another and
does not necessarily imply a reduction in the present value of foreign
liabilities. These replacements involved benefits and costs for the debtor
country, and the net balance between them will generally depend on the
specific operation being considered. A critical issue is how much of the
secondary market discount is captured by the debtor. A domestic distribu-
tional issue is also present; if the government is the major debtor and a
large fraction of the discount is captured by the private sector, there will
still remain the difficult problem of transferring resources from private
agents to the public sector.
The main benefits of debt-equity swaps for the debtor country are that,
as long as the new foreign investment face restrictions on profits and
capital repatriation during an initial period, there will be a liquidity
relief. Moreover, profit repatriation normally bears a higher relationship
to the country's economic activity than interest payments. Also, as
discussed by the literature on DFI reviewed in the previous section new
investments will, in principle, contribute to the country's growth in terms
of technology transfer and managing technique. Finally, new investments may
help to increase capital formation in the host country. This final point,19
which relates to the so-called "additionality" problem, is indeed crucial in
evaluating the overall benefits of a debt equity swaps program.
However, debt-equity swaps can also impose costs to the debtor:
(1) there can be substitution between investment with fresh resources and
debt-equity conversions; (2) these transactions can generate inflationary
pressures when the local debtor is the Central Bank and it redeems the debt
in local currency --althoughthis need not be the case if redemption is
done using other financial instruments -and(3) similar pressures can
occur in domestic interest rates if the local debtor issues bonds, uses its
available liquidity or increases its demand for credit in order to redeem
the foreign debt.
Debt-buybacks, on the other hand, involve the repurchase of debt in
secondary markets, either directly by the debtor or through an intermediary.
The local debtor then uses existing assets or increases in domestic liabili-
ties to redeem the foreign debt. A crucial issue is where do the funds used
to finance the buyback come from. Generally speaking there are three
alternative sources: (1) international donations, as in the Bolivian case;
(2) the country's international reserves; or (3) reversed flight capital
as in the Chilean case discussed below. A related key element is the
provision of foreign exchange to carry out the operation. When no access to
the official reserves is granted, the foreign exchange will normally be
obtained through the parallel -- orblack -- market.The potential benefits
of debt-buybacks are:(1) that, unlike the case of debt-equity deals, an
official foreign liability is extinguished for the country, and (2) that
these operations may constitute a vehicle for the repatriation of offshore
capital held by residents, who would ultimately provide the dollars required
by the transaction. The costs in which the country can incur if this strat-20
egy is followed are higher domestic interest rates or increased inflation,
which are qualitatively analogous to the costs involved in debt-equity
conversions. Additionally, in those cases where foreign exchange is not
provided by the Central Bank, debt buyback operations may result in a hike
in the -parallel market spread.
As Kenen (1990) has pointed out, at the end the cost and benefits of
debt-swap schemes will depend on debtors and creditors valuations of the
debt; valuation that may, in fact, differ from that of the secondary market.
In fact, there will be debt relief when the present value of the debtor's
resource transfer, calculated using the discount factor of the debtor, is
reduced in relation to the contractual value of the debt. Most studieson
debt reduction have assuned that although the discount factor usedby the
debtor can exceed the cost of foreign funds, it is constant through time and
independent of whether the relief schemes are successful or not. This, of
course, need not be the case; moreover, under most circu1stances it will not
be the case. In an open economy the social rate of discount will bea
weighted average of the three main sources of funds: increased savings,
displaced investment opportunities and foreign borrowing. The cost of
foreign funds, in turn, will be greatly affected by the degree ofcountry
risk, or perceived probability of default, as perceived by the debtor. To
the extent that the debt reduction schemes affect the degree to which the
country can access the international capital market and/or the perceived
degree of country risk the social rate of discount will go do-n,13 and the
present value of a given stream of payments will increase. This, in turn,
will reduce the extent of the debt relief achieved through the scheme in
14
question.21
111.2 Chile's Debt-Conversion Schemes
A nwnber of authors have dismissed the generalized use of debt-swaps to
reduce the debt problem on a series of grounds. For instance, referring to
debt-equity swaps, Kenen (1990) has said:
Difficulties arise on three fronts. First, many debtor countries
are ambivalent about direct foreign investment of any sort. Sec-
ond, they wonder whether they are attracting additional investment
Third, they worry about inflationary side effects
(p. 12)
Chile, however, has made vigorous use of debt conversion mechanisms,
substantially reducing her stock of foreign debt. When the debt crisis
erupted in 1982, Chile's foreign debt was $17.2 billion, a figure
representing one of the highest debt per capita in the world. Through the
aggressive use of a variety of debt conversion schemes, between 1985 and
February of 1990 Chile has reduced its debt by more than $9 billion U.S.!
In this subsection I evaluate the two most important mechanisms -- thedebt
conversion or buyback program (Chaoter 18) and the debt equity-swaps program
(Chapter 19) --usedin Chile during the last five years (see Table 6 for
the exact figures involved in the different debt reduction schemes).15
The Chapter 18 (Ch. 18) mechanism allows domestic debtors to
(indirectly) buy their own foreign liabilities in the secondary market. The
Central Bank does not provide foreign exchange at the official rate for
these operations; the institutions that participate in this scheme have to
obtain the required foreign exchange in the domestic parallel market. Due
to a number of macroeconomic effects discussed below the Chilean authorities
have tightly controlled the access to the Ch, 18 mechanism. Until September
of 1985 the Central Bank of Chile allocated a monthly quota to private
banks. This allowed them to acquire up to that amount of its debt in theTABLE 6











Source: Banco Central de Chile22
secondary market. Starting in October 1985, instead of allocating the
quotas the Central Bank has auctioned them.
The actual mechanics of debt conversions is rather complicated. A
typical QJdebtoperation can be described as follows: A Chilean
institution, a private bank say, decides to rescue some of its outstanding
foreign liabilities. The first step is to buy a quota in the Central Bank
auction. Next it locates, through an international broker, a holder of its
debt that is willing to sell it. At that point the Chilean bank will have
to obtain foreign exchange in the local parallel market. This will imply
two steps:(1) Pesos have to be obtained to buy the foreign exchange. For
this purpose the bank issues domestic debt which it sells in Chile.(2) It
contacts an intermediary who buys the foreign exchange in the parallel
market. Once the foreign exchange is on hand the debt isactually bought
and the liability is extinguished.
The public sector, and most notably the Central Bank and thestate-
owned Banco del Estado, have also used Ch. 18 to reduce some of theirdebt.
In this case, however, the payment is not made with foreignexchange.
Instead the public sector foreign liabilities are exchanged forlong term
bonds denominated in domestic currency. The value of thesepeso bonds have
fluctuated in the Chilean secondary market at around 88percent of par
value. A variant of the Ch. 18 program is the so-called Annex 4 of Charter
j. This scheme amounts to exchanging liabilities in foreigncurrency for
newly issued stock shares in a Chilean corporation. These operations are
directly monitored by the Central Bank and are not subject to the quota
allocation. A key aspect of this scheme is that it has not been financed
with reserves or other official funds but rather with reversedcapital23
flight. This turns out to be very important in determining the benefits of
the scheme.
An important aspect of Ch. 18 operations is that Chilean residents
capture most of the secondary market discount. Three agents have shared the
discouxt; (1) the Central Bank, (2) the suppliers of foreignexchange in
the parallel market, and (3) the various intermediaries. Larrain(1988)
has calculated that in 1987-88 the average discount on Ch. 18operations
amounted to 35.7%. Of these, the Central Bank got the lion's sharecaptur-
ing 20.5 points, the suppliers to the parallel market for foreign exchange
got 3.3 percentage points, with the rest corresponding to different fees)6
Chapter 18 conversion schemes have several macroeconomic effects.
First, there is pressure on the black market for foreign exchange. It is
for this reason that in 1986 the government established thequota system.
It was expected that in this way the spread in this market wouldnot become
"excessively" high. This was basically accomplished. In the first half of
1988, however, the parallel market premium started to increase,mainly for
political reasons, and as a way to avoid additional pressures on this market
Ch. 18 operations were temporarily suspended. An importantquestion is
whether the funds currently used to finance this scheme in theparallel mar-
ket -- fundscorresponding to past capital flight -- couldhave been lured
to the country in a more efficient way. If the answer to thisquestion is
positive, the desirability of this program becomes more dubious. The second
macroeconomic effect is related to the scheme's effect on interestrates.
The domestic counterpart of the rescue of foreign liabilitiesis the
creation of internal debt. This, of course, putspressure on the domestic
capital market and as a result domestic interest rates will tend to rise.
It is important to notice, however, that contrary to somepopular accounts24
the Ch. 18 program has no shortrun consequences on the creation ofmoney by
the Central Bank.
It is difficult to quantify exactly, andto summarize in a single
number, the costs associated with thesemacroeconomic effects. There seems
to be consensus, however, that these arerelatively minor.17 The
desirability of the scheme, then, will basicallydepend on whether it is
beneficial for the country to capture a discountthat fluctuates around 32%.
The answer to this depends partially
on whether Chile expects to pay its
debt in full or if it expects to havea large proportion of its debt
forgiven (or alternatively, if it expects torepudiate it))8 If, as the
Chilean authorities have pointed
out, the government expects to pay all its
debt in full, buying some of it ata discount is beneficial. If, however,
it is expected that at the end of the road
the country will not pay all of
its debt and that a large fraction of it
will be forgiven, it is not clearly
beneficial to buy it in the secondarymarket, even if it carries a sizeable
discount.
The ChaterJ program corresponds todebt-equity swaps or a debt
capitalization scheme. A typical operationcan be described in the follow-
ing way: A foreign investor buys Chileanprivate debt at a discount in the
secondary market and converts it into internal debt.This debt is then sold
in the domestic secondary market and theproceeds are used to acquire
domestic (productive) assets, or to financedomestic investment projects.
Participants in this scheme cannot repatriateprofits for the first 4 years
and the principal can only be repatriatedafter 10 years. charter 19
operations are not subject to quota allocation andare approved on a case-
by-case basis by the Central Bank; it isexpected that this case-by-case
approach will allow screening hna fide investors andto avoid "round trip-25
ping" operations. There is no Central Bank commission on these operations.
Most participants in Ch, 19 schemes have invested in the mining and other
natural resources sectors (forestry). Contrary to Ch. 18, Chapter 19
operations do not result in the extinction of a foreign liability. They
constitute a replacement of one type of liability for another. As noted in
subsection 111.1 above, to the extent that profits repatriation is delayed
for 4 years there is a beneficial liquidity effect. While in the operations
approved through Chapter 18 Chilean residents have captured most of the
secondary market discount, in the case of Ch, 19 most of the discount has
been captured by the foreign investor. This, of course, is equivalent to
providing a major subsidy to foreign investment. Larrain (1988) estimated
that this subsidy amounted to approximately 35% in 1987. It is unlikely
that providing such a sizeable subsidy is the most efficient way to attract
additional foreign investment. Moreover, the econometric results reported
in Section II indicate that the recent political and economic developments
in Chile would have provided an appropriate environment for increased DFI.
This, in turn suggests that Chapter 19 operations probably have not provided
an appropriate environment for orthant additionality component.19
To sum up, Chile has been tremendously successful in using the
secondary market to reduce its debt. Approximately 50% of' Chile's initial
(that is 1982) long term debt to banks has been converted in the last few
years. The two main mechanisms used for these purposes are fundamentally
different. Chapter 18 consists of debt conversions or debt rescue schemes
where Chilean residents have captured most of the secondary market discount.
Moreover, after the access quota allocation system was implemented it has
been the Central Bank who has captured most of this discount. By and large,
given the fact that it has been financed with reversed capital flight, Q26
j has been an innovative program that seems to have resulted in positive
net benefits to the country. Charter 19, on the other hand is a debt
capitalization program. It has provided an implicit subsidy to foreign
investors of approximately 30%, and has resulted in very little, ifany,
additionality (see also the discussion in Ffrench-Davis, 1990).
IV.Coric1udjnRemarks
An important component in the developing countries' strategy for
recovery and growth is the design of mechanisms for attracting private
foreign capital inflows to finance investment projects and adjustment
programs. However, since for most nations bank loans and bonds issues are
closed avenues in the post-debt crisis, the search for increased foreign
resources has turned towards alternative sources of funds. A natural
candidate for this is direct foreign investment. In this paper I have
analyzed the potential role of DFI in providing additional foreign funds
from two perspectives. First, I have estimated empirical equations inan
effort to assess the roles played by structural economic variables,policy
variables and political variables in determining DFI. This type of analysis
allows us to understand how, if at all, governzients can implement policies
that would induce additional DFI into their countries. Second, I have
analyzed the role of debt-swaps operations as new mechanisms to encourage a
higher volume of DFI and other forms of capital inflows.
A number of conclusions emerge from this paper. First, it is possible
to identify a well-defined empirical function for the determination of DFI
to developing countries. In fact, our empirical results have shown that for
the 1971-81 period DFI can be explained both by economic and political
variables. Second, and more specifically, our results indicate that, with27
other things given, countries with lower incomeper capita, larger internal
markets, and domestic investment ratios, will tend to be moreattractive to
DFI. More importantly, however, the empirical results show thatpolicies
tending to move the economy towards greater openness and international
competitiveness, as well as to reducing the size of government, will havean
important positive effect on DFI. Third, although our resultssuggest quite
clearly that political variables (political instability and politicalpolar-
ization) have played a significant role in determining DFI,they also show
that these political variables have not been the mostimportant ones for
explaining these flows. In fact, the analysis of standardized estimates
clearly shows that political considerations have been the leastimportant of
all the considered factors in determining DFI.
From a policy perspective these results are important.They clearly
indicate that countries that undertake structural liberalizationreforms,
that will open up their foreign trade and that willprovide an enhanced role
to the private sector, will tend to attract greater flows ofDFI. Moreover,
this suggests that the Eastern European countriesare likely to continue
getting considerably attention from foreign investors,attracting large
amounts of funds. However, it is important to bear in mindthat, even if a
country is overly successful, and is able to drastically increase the flow
of DFI, the absolute volume of these funds will still berelatively small.
Table 1, in fact, shows clearly that for most countriesduring 1971-81 DFI
was, on average, below one percent of GD?. This means, then, thata
critically important question at this juncture is whether thereare new
mechanisms, not available during the period under study in theregression
analysis, that can be used to induce a larger volume of DFI and other forms
of capital flows. This is indeed the subject of Section IIIof the paper28
where I analyze the role of debt-swap operations, and discussthe Chilean
experience with these policies.
Between 1985 and February of 1990, Chile has reduced its debtby more
than one half through the aggressive use of threedebt-swaps programs. The
two most important of these have been a debt-rescue mechanisms anda debt
equity swap program. While in the former one the funds used to retire debt
in the secondary market have come from reversed flightcapital, in the debt-
equity swaps programs the funds have been provided by foreign investors.
Our analysis suggests that the Chilean debt-equityswaps has not resulted in
significant "additionality", and that to a large extent theprogram has
amounted to providing a large subsidy to previouslyexisting foreign
investors. On the other hand, we also argue that the Chilean debtrescue
operations have been highly successful, permitting Chilean nationalsto use
reversed capital flight to retire debt at the same timeas effectively
capturing a discount of approximately 30% in the secondary market. The
Chilean experience, although limited, provides some evidencethat suggests
LDCs that embark on secondary market operations shouldconcentrate their
efforts on debt-rescue schemes rather than on debt-equitymechanisms.
All of this, then, indicates that although individual LDCscould
increase the flow of DFI, the absolute magnitude of these fundswill not be
dramatic. Other avenues should continue to be explored,including (closed-
end) investment funds, increased official assistance and,especially, the
repatriation of flight capital. What is clear, however, is that the
implementation of structural reform policies willopen up and modernize
these economies will not only have a positive impacton DFI but will also
have a positive impact on reversing capital flight.29
ENDNOTES
1For data on this and relatedaspects of the adjustment see he Annual
Report of the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America
(ECLA), 1990.
2See, for example,Lipsey (1988) and Ray (1989).
3Root and Ahmed(1979)is one of the few works that address thesame ques-
tion using an analytical framework somewhat similarto the one presented here.
4An importantquestion is whether an analysis based on data from the
1980s would provide insights on what islikely to happen in terms of DFI in
the l990s. Anyone familiar with theramifications of the debt crisis is
aware of the "abnormality" of the 1980s. Indeed, inmy view, the l980s
represent an extraordinary period with important but limitedlessons for the
future of DFI behavior.
5See, for example, Williamson(1975), Maggee (1977), and especially
Dunning (1981).
6Blejer and Khan (1984) havestudied the issue ofcomplementarity
between private and public sectorinvestment, and have found a significant
amount of crowding-out.
7See, for example,Lipsey (1988).
8Rellejner (1989),however, reports that in practice tax inducements,
such as tax holidays, have not beenvery important.30
9Notice, however, that theremay be a simultaneity problem here, since
there has been a tendency for advanced countries to investin manufacturing.
10Eaton and Gersovjtz(1984), for example, have recently derived a
model on capital mobility, political risk, andexpropriation.
We use thedebt-swaps term generically to refer to any mechanism
whereby old debt is exchange or reduced at a price below faceprice. They
include debt-debt swaps, debt-rescue swaps,securitizacion, exit bonds,
debt-equity swaps and others. Chile has used debt-swapsaggressively.
Also, Bolivia is often referred to as a successful case ofa debt-buyback
scheme. However, this is not completely clear. See thecontroversy in the
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1988, 2.
12
Recently a growing controversy on whether there are circumstances
under which the use of this type of debt-swap mechanism isbeneficial for
both debtors and creditors has erupted. A nunber of authorshave, in fact,
recently argued that under most realistic circumstances debt-swap schemes
will not benefit the poorer nations (Bulow andRogoff, 1989). On this
controversy see, for example, the papers by Kenen (1990), Eaton (1990),
Sachs (1990), and Bulow and Rogoff (1990) in the Winter 1990issue of
xrnal of Economic Persoectjves. See also the collection ofpapers edited
by Frenkel, Dooley and Wickhani (1989).
131n Edwards (1986)
number of empirical studies have investigated the determinantsof
the market's perceived probability of default. Forexample, in Edwards
(1984) I found that this probability depends on a small numberof variables,31
the most important of which are the level of the debt itself and theinvest-
ment ratio. A higher stock of debt reduces the probability ofrepayment,
while a higher investment ratio increases that probability.Naturally, this
perceived probability will determine the price of the debt in thesecondary
market; setting risk aversion aside the market value will be one minus this
probability.
15These names stem from the fact thatthe regulations that govern these
operations are contained in Chapters 18 and 19 of theCorTrnendiun ofRules on
International Exchange of the Central Bank of Chile.
16These computations referto all operations that have used hj8, and
not only to those of the private sector.
'7Larrain (1988)
180f course, as pointedout above, what really matters is whether the
debtor's expectations differ from those of the buyer.
19From an empiricalperspective, it is not easy to quantify whether
there is or is not additionality, and the opinionsappear to be divided.
Ffrench-Davis (1987), for example questions the existence ofadditionality,
while Fontaine (1989) argues that there is a significantproportion of new
funds. Larrain (1988) takes a somewhat intermediateposition, arguing that
the fact that foreign banks have opted to participate, inspite of the fact
that equity investment is not their main line of business,is a sign that
there is at least some additionality.32
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